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NOTES ON THE RECENT MONETARY POLICY IN IRAZIL*
BY AFFONSO CtLSO PA.STORI
This paper hostwoahjecttti's. First, to build a model to measure both the short-run impact and the dvnarnu
adjusimetit of the raze of inflation due to tIlanges in nwner supple, wage rare, and exchange rare Second,
to eraluate the eftteienes' of the monelar' polite, identifsing the instrunwnls used to produce a gradual
reduction In the raze of growth of the mont'v supple.
I. INTRODUCTION
The present paper has two objectives: To build a model tomeasure both the short-
run impact and the dynamic adjustnterit of the rate of inflation due to changes in
moneysupply, wage rate, and exchange rate. Second, to evaluate the efficiency of
the monetary policy, identifying the instruments used to produce the gradual
reduction in the rate of growth of money supply, paying specific attention to the
behavior of the inflationary tax during the process of adjustment.
2. THE: DYNAMICS OF INFLATION
The model developed in this paper follows the tradition of the Quantity
Theory of Money' starting from the hypothesis that the long-run demand for
money is a stable function of real income and the cost of holding money, whose
dominant component is the expected rate of inflation. That is:
(2.1) = - cE, + liv,
where ,nis the desired real balance, y, is real income and E, is the expected rate of
inflation. rn' and y1 are expressed in natural logarithms.
The expected rate of inflation follows the adaptative expectation model
suggested by Cagan.2
(2.2) (1 - bL)E1=(I -
whe're L is the lag operator, and ir, = (log F- log J- -)is the actual rate of
inflation.
Simonsen (1970) argues that in the last three or four years the rate of inflation would be onl
mildly correlated with the rate of change in money supply, and he tries to emphasize the role of feed-
back mechanisms (like indexation) on the price level. Morley (19701 suggestsa "hybrid" explanation.
emphasizing the dominant iole of a cost push inflation in some periods, and of a demand.pulI inflation
in others.
2 Muth (1960) showed that,under some specibc hypothesis about the stochastic specificailon of
the model, the above equation produces the best permanent predictor of the future inflation,in the
sense that it minimizes the mean square error of the prediction.
* The author thanks Professors Lance Taylor. Miguel AngelBroda and Ruben Dario Almoracid
for their useful suggestions. Of course, none of them is responsible for mistakes still present in this
paper.
489If at any moment desired andactual real cash balances arc equal the demand
for money model would becompleted with (2.1) and (2.2). If there is a possibility
of stock disequilibrium in the moneymarket, or a flow disequilibrium, i.e., therate
of change in the actual stockof money is different from the desired rate of change
of the nominal cash balances, theappropriate adjustment equation takes the form
(2.3) in, - in,_=(1 -d)(in - m,_ )+g(u,(1 -L)logi1')
whereni,is the logarithm of the actual real cash balance (logM, -log p),M'is the
desired nominal stock of money, and p,=(logM, --log M,....)is the rate of
growth of the money supply. Equation (2.3) has two different adjustment mechan-
isms. The first term of the right hand is a "Nerlovian" type of adjustment, showing
that if the real stock is greater (or smaller) than the actual, people will try to adjust
their real cash balances in proportion to the gap between(m -ni,). It is shown
that any change in the long-run demand will not lead to an immediate change in
actual real cash balances, and they will react with some lags.
The second term on the right hand shows that if the rate of growth of the
nominal money supply becomes greater than the rate at which people are willing
to accumulate nominal cash balances, in the very short run people will hold 100
percent g of this excess in their real cash balances.
We can start from an initial situation of full equilibrium (of stocks and flows)
with constant y andE.Suppose that at the time t the rate of growth of themoney
supply, p,, becomes greater than the rate of growth of the desired nominal cash
balances (1 - L) log M, and from t ± 1 on both become identical again. Thenat
the beginning of the adjustment process, a proportion g of the difference (ii,-
(1 - L) log M) will be held as real cash balances. From the next periodon we will
havein,_>rnand the Ncrlovian term of(2.3) will show howconvergence to the
new equilibrium will occur.
In the very short run, it is possible that the population will hold a!l theexcess
of p over (I - L)M, and in this special case g=I, In a longer period we should
expect 0 If the period is long enough to allow full adjustmentwe will have
g and d converging towards zero.3
To study the implications of our model for the analysis ofinflationary
dynamics, we use a simple form of (2.3). The demand for nontinalcash balances
can be expressed as:
log M'log P - E, + fit',
where P is the expected price level.The rate of change of the desired nominalcash baIaces will be
(1 - L)log M=(I - L)log P- (l - L)E, ± fl(1 - L)v,.
If the rates of change inreal income and expectedrate of inflation are small
and assuming that therate of change of the expected price levelis the expected rate
3Amore careful analysis of this model,comparing itsrelative meritsin relationto atternati%e specificat,ons (like the oneproposed by Chow (1966), forexample), ispresentedin another paper. SeePastore(1973a).
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ofinflation, we will have(iL)M = E,, and equation (2.3) can be rewritten in the
form
uI)(ni n,_) -F g(p, - E,).
The implication of this hypothesis for the dynamics of inflation can be
analyzed closing the model with the quantity equation that, expressed in the form
ofgrowth rates, is
(2.4) it = (I L)m1.
From (2.1) and (2.3) we get
(2.5) (1dL)m, = - ( Id)E, + fJ( I - d)i'. + g(;L, - E,)
and using (2.2) we get
(2.6) (1dL) (IhL)rn, = - b) [c( Id) + gJLn, + /?( I
x (IhL)v -F- g( IhL)p.




The model has a solution in the form of "rational distributed lags" that is
A(L) A(L)





P(L) is the determinant associated with the matrix of the coefficients of the
endogenous variables, it also gives the characteristic equationofthe two difl'crence
equations (2.7) and (2.8), thus permitting the analysis of the stability conditions.
To analyze the initial impact onit ofmovements in p or v, we can use the
polynomials in (2.7) and (2.8) given by
A(I.)= (1(1d) - flb(ld)L
A(L) = g -{gb ±[a(l - d) ± g](lb)}L
B(L)=/J(1 d)+fl(1 d)(l ±h)LfJb(l d)L2
B(L) = (1g) -- [b + dg(1 + b)]L + b(dg)L2.
In the stationary equilibrium, when i' and p have been constant for a period





0 1That is. a rate of monetary expansion of 1 percent will produce a I percent rate
of inflation. A i ise of real income from one constant level to another will show its
effect on the rate of inflation only in the intermediate period.
But real cash balances will change by /? times the change in the income level.
The stability of equilibrium will depend on the two roots of P(L) given by
{b + 1 + (I - h)[c(l - d) + g]}
± d+ (1 b)[c(1 d) +g]2- 4hd± (1 h)[(l - d)+ g]}
The rate of inflation will oscillate or not depending upon
{h+d+(l h)k(I d)+g]24{hd±(1 b)[(l d)+g].
Onceband d can only take values between zero and one, the stability condi-
tion of the model is given by4
bd + (1 - b)[(ld) + g] < 1.
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The demand for money expressed by (2.5) was estimated assuming different
values for the coefficient of expectation (I- b) in the equation
(2.9) in1 = -[c(1 -d) + g]E1 +/i(I - d)y + gz, + dm,_ + e,
where e, is the disturbance term assumed to be serially uncorrelated.
The difficulty of using the iterative method in thiscase is due to the presence of
the lagged real cash balances as an independent variable in the model,which makes
R2 quite insensitive to the variations in (1-b).
The results are presented on Table 1. As wesee all the coefficients are highly
significant, and the R2 reaches the maximum approximatelyat the point where
(I - b) = 0.4, that is taken as an estimate of the coefficient ofexpectations.
There are no reasons to reject the hypothesis that theequilibrium is stable,
and the the convergence path isan oscillatory one.
Table 2 and Figure 1 show the typical path of therate of inliation due to a I
percent change in the rate of monetary expansion. Part (A) ofthe figure shows the
path of the rate of inflation.
The rate of inflation will take something like3 to 4 quarters to overshoot
the rate of monetary expansion, meaningthat the initial effects of themoney supply
on prices are quite small and that the lagsare long.
In the reduced form of the model,the rate of inflation can be expressedas a





492where thetvare the "weights'S of the implicit model of distributed lags betweenit
and the past values of; and (1- L)t (independentvariables). Thepattern of the
weights is presented on Table 2 and part (B) of Figure I. showing that aftersome
time lag we get negative weights.
TABLE I
DEMAND FOR MONEY



















0.2 0.759 -0.691 0.130 0.847 0.605 0.950 .354
(3.756)(2.077)(10.027) (3.874)
0.3 1.202 -0.917 0.178 0.773 0.666 0.95K 1.530
(5.075)(2.986) (9.494) (4.585)
0.4 1.505 - 1.059 0.185 0.736 0.676 0.962 1.814
(5.917)j3.342) (9.391) (4.953)
0.5 1.464 -0.945 0.177 0.745 0.640 0.962 1.932
(5.904)(3.233) (9.580) (4.736)
0.6 1.384 -0.854 0.165 0.760 0.607 0.962 2.03!
(5.810)(3.041) (9.850) (4.504)
0.7 1.277 -0.777 0.150 0.779 0.571 0960 2.118
(5.607)(2.772)(10.128) (4.211)
0.8 1.160 -0.706 0.135 0.800 0.56! 0.959 2.180
(5.472)(2.525)(I0.48) (4.101)
0.9 1.040 -0.645 0.120 0.821 0.553 0.959 2.233
(5.300)(2.26lj(10.822) (4.000)TABLE 2
WEIOFIrS OE THE iMPLiCIT DISTRIBUTED LAGSMODEL ANt) Till TJML PATH 01 it.
Note: The weights and the time path were calculated with the following values
for the coefficients:
fl=O.701;g= 0.676;d=0.736;
6 = 0.600; a = (I - d) + g = 1.059.
This result is consistent with the existence ofa demand for money depending
on the cost of holding money.5
4. THE BRAZILIAN INFLATION
Is it possible to explain the Brazilian inflationincluding only the monetary
variables?To what extent can we attributeto other "nonmonetary variables" some
explanatory power in the behavior ofthe general price level?
Lel us assume an initial situation where therate of inflation was in equilibrium(with a constant
real cash balance) with p= it at the level of 0 percent per quarter. If the monetary authorities decidedto
make a once-and.for-a1I change inji of 1 percent per quarter and fixing p at this new level, the public
would probably not be able, in the shortrun, to get rid of the excess flow supply of money.
After some time the expectedrate of inflation starts to rise, increasing the cost of holdingmoney,
reducing the desired real stock ofmoney, and adding new inflalionary pressures. At the end of the
process, the rate of inflation and thecost of holding money will be necessarily higher givingan actual stock of money (equal to thedesired one) smaller than in the previousequilibrium. So, at sonic time after the change inu the rate of inflation has to overshootp. staying above Ibis rate the necessary time to reduce actual real cashbalances until they become equalto the desired stock. This mechanism of adjustment implies thatthe relalion bctween therate of inflation in land the past rates np shas a distributed time lag patternwith negative weights which havealready been found by Diaz (1970) for Argentina and Pastore(1973a) for Brazil.
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25 0.013 1.158There is a certain degree of agreement that therate of inflation in Brazil is
influenced by at least three additional variables: (a) thewage rate readjusiments
(averaRe wages and "minimum wage" in particular): (b) exchangerate correction:
(c)fluctuations of the agricultural output. We could adda fourth variable that was
probably important during the first part of the Brazilian stabilizationprogram,
which consisted in decontrol ofsome prices that were frozen by the practice of
repressing inflation. Some of these variablescan have their effects quantified while
some others cannot. In particular, data are only available for minimumwages and
exchanged rates, but there is no information about the quarterly agriculturaloutput
and the form of processing the so-called "corrective inflation." Using ft forthe
estimated rate of inflation as a function of monetarycomponents only, that is,
ft =- (I - L)th,, where th, is the estimated real cash balances in equation (2.5),
we can test the influence of the other variables by the relation
(4. I ) tt = f(r, é,.+ ir
whereand, are the rates of change in minimum wage and exchange rate.
Table 3 gives the main results, The first relation isa simple regression between
the quarterly rates of inflation, actual and estimated. The second is thesame rela-
tion but defining it1 as the yearly rate of inflationat the end of quarter z.
The regression coefficient between i and ft is lower thanone, and only by
reducing the significance below 5 percent would the confidence interval include
unity (in the case of quarterly rates only).
The last two equations show the introduction ofwage rate and exchange rate.
Both have the highly significant hypothesis that at least two of the "remaining"
variables are influencing the rate of inflation.
The explanatory power of the model is higher whenwe include wages and
exchange rates.6
TABLE 3
RATES or INFLATION AcruAL AND ESTIMATFD
Note: The numbers in parenthesis below the coefficients are the values of StudentI.
'I = Si
6 It is recognized thatthe introduction of w and i in the model was done on a very ad 6oc basis.
without the specification of the underlining model. The theory could bedeveloped through many
ways, but I find the most attractive the one suggested by Harberger (1966).
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0.028 0.668- 0.4062.407 n Quarterly
(5.782)
0.015 0.966 -- 09011.180 i Annual at
(21.094) the end of
quarter
0.0310.607 - 0.405 it Quartedy
(5782)






with (I6) = 0.4
with (I - 45) = 0.4
with (I - 6) = 0.4
with (1 - 45) = 0.5
with (1 - 45) = 0.5a
0
L
Figure 2Impact of a wage or exchange rate correction on the rate of inflation
It can be shown that a change in wages or exchange rate will have lagged
eflects on the rate of inflation.7
Figure 2 presents the typical distributed lag eflècts of a change in wages or
exchange rate calculated. using the estimated coefficients in t2.5).
Note that not only because of an initial impact but also because of the feed-
backs (generated by the expectations) the "cost-push" remains positive for many
periods ahead. Then, it oscillates around the assumed equilibrium value of zero.
A succession of shocks can produce a strong effect, not only when each one of
them occurs but also in many periods ahead. lithe "repressed inflation" is sub-
stantial, the economy will face an "autonomous" inflationary process that will not
only occur at the moment of the correction, but will generate effects on it for a
longer period.
Figure 3 shows the comparison between the actual and predicted values of it
and m.
In fact we can re-write (2.4) in the form:
(4.2) it,=p,L)i+a
where
(4.3 = a,-- + e,
is a linear combination of effects of the "other xariables" influencing it and the coefficientsa and a2
are the ones estimated on Table 3. The system (4.2). (4.3) can be expressed in the matrixform, giving
(IdL)(l hL) (1 h)fa(l- d)4-gL]l
m1fill -d)(I dL)illiL)
(I - L) I jirj 0 1 L°'
that pci mits finding the expression for therate of inflation given by
B(L)y, + B(L)p, + B1(L)o
where all the polynomials have already been definedpreviously, except for B( L), that is:
(4.4) B(L) = I - (b + ifL + hdL2.
It IS easy to see that P(l)'B(1)= I. what indicates that the final effect of salaries and exchangerate
readjustments on it will be given, in eachcase by the respective coefficient of the relation (4 Ii. However.
a change in wages or exchange rate willcause lagged effects on the rate of inflation whose time path





1963 1965 1967 1969
Figure 3Actual and estimated values ofarid ni
5. ASPECTS OF THE STABILIZATION STRATEC'IY
An important implication of the previous analysis is that fromthe point of
view of the rate of inflation money only matters in the longrun. Even though I do
not wish to dispute the precision of the estimated time lags,8 there is evidence that
such time lags are quite long, and this is probablyone of the main reasons for
the presence of cycles of large amplitude in income velocity and realcash balances.
A rise in the actual rate of the monetary expansion will, inthe very short run,
increase real cash balances above the previous equilibrium level,and the "measured"
income velocity of money will drop, simulatinga behavior similar to the one at the
"liquidity trap".
When p starts to rise it is quite probable that the rate of inflationstays below p
for a while. Then expectations start to be revised and the public willget rid of real
cash balances. If the monetary authorities eventually stabilizep at a constant
level in some future period,itwill overshoot p.
This shows that the monthly or even quarterly contemporaneous correlation
between iv and p will probably be very small and the monetary authoritiescan
suflër the illusion that money does not matter at all, thinking of inflationas a pure
cost-push phenomenon.
Due to the general tendency of governments to fight inflation through its
manifestations and not through its main causes, when an open inflationstarts, the
repressed inflation also starts. This is done through the control of several prices
(in general the most "political prices", i.e., of those goods and services that have
larger weights in some index that is believed to measure inflation). Sucha pro-
cedure introduces distortions in relative prices causing inefficiencies, and shows
that at some time this repressed inflation has to be absorbed by theeconom When
Griliches's analysis (1967) shows that the lags are highly sensitive to estimated values of the
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Figure 4Paths of fP and it under seeraJ hypotheses of the behaviot ofp and of the corrective
inflation
the government decides to pursue its stabilizationprogram it must absorb the
repressed inflation, freeing the prices thatwere controlled. We can analyze with
Figure 4 the possible governmental stabilizationpolicies when repressed inflation
is present and when it is absent.
Figure 4A represents the strategies of "gradualapproach' and "shock
treatment" if there is no repressed inflation. Westart from an initial equilibrium
position where the monetary expansionwas fixed at jig, with the rate of inflation
at the same level (assuming constant real income).The path of (M/P) anditis
presented in the Figure between pointsa and b, with the inflation rate and real
cash balance following a cyclical path. If themonetary authorities can sustainp
on the new level p for a long enough period, therate of inflation will decrease, but
with large cyclical fluctuation inreal cash balances. The gradualisticpath implies
a small reduction, the monetary authoritieswait until the rate of inflationapproxi-
mately converges to equilibrium andonly then a new reduction inp is done. The
reduction of the rate of inflation willbe slow, but the oscillation in(M/P) vill be smaller.
The Figure 4B presents at first theshock treatment in aneconomy that has to
absorb the repressed inflation. If themonetary authorities decontrol prices therate of inflation will increase, reducingreal cash balances. Twoalternatives can happen in this case. First,p is kept at the same levelit0,until the rate of inflationconverges to an equilibrium around point a'. Inthis case, some cycles of liquiditywill occur. In the second alternativethe monetary authoritieswould proceed toa corrective inflation, but try to avoida bigger increase of the inflationrate, through a reduction in p. In this caseitand (M/P) will oscillatearound h'. This Figure showsthe paths followed byitand (MIP) it is easy tosee that the cycles in these twovariables are of a much bigger amplitude than thosein Figure 4A.




the governmental policies are in affecting the behavior of the money supply. These
issues are taken up in the next two sections.
6. MONEY SUPPLY
Contrary to the common practice of other countries where the creation of
money through the expansion of demand and time deposits can only be done by
the commercial banks, in Brazil this function is exercised simultaneously by the
commercial banks and by the monetary authorities. This is due to the fact that
in Brazil the monetary authorities are composed of two banking institutions:
Banco do Brasil, which is a commercial bank and a financial agent of monetary
authorities, and Banco Central.
Then, the net monetary liabilities of monetary authorities held by the public
are given by adding time and demand deposits of the public in Banco do Brasil,
plus the net reserve position of commercial banks, plus the currency held by the
public:
(6.!) B=Dm+R+M.
With B designating the monetary base and k the money multiplier, we can express:
(6.2) M = kB,
The expression for the money multiplier can be obtained by defining money as:
(6.3) = -f D
and then
I I
(6.4) k =1 (1 li)(l r)(l b)
where M is the total currency; D is the total deposits in the commercial banks and
Banco do Brasil, D = DBBDBC;r is the reserve ratio (voluntary plus compulsory),
R/DBC= r: where r = rL. + r: h is the ratio of currency of the total money supply,
M/M = Ii: b is the average propensity of the public to make deposits in the Banco
do BrasH, b = D/D.
in this model the two instruments of monetary policy are the total monetary
base and the compulsory reserve requirements r: the other coefficients, h, rr and b,
depend on the behavior of the public and the banking system.
Given the valus of the instruments under control of the monetary authorities,
and predicting the values of the coefficients that depend on the behavior of the
public and the banking system, we can get a reasonable prediction of the behavior
of the nominal money supply.
Starting from relation (6.2), we can write:
1 dM IthuI dB -=---+-- M diin diB di
that splits the rate of change in money supply into the rate of change of the money










Figure 5Decomposition of the quarterly rate of the monetary expansion
Figure 5 shows the rates of growth of the monetary base, total money supply.
and the money multiplier. We can see that the rate of changeofthe money multi-
plier is not small, and that the dominant componentofthe rate of changeofthe
money supply is the rateofchangeofthe monetary base.9 The relevantquestions
are: what are the sources ofgrowth of the monetary base? and what are the mechan-
isms ofeontro! used during the several phasesof the Brazilian stabilizationprogram?
For this purpose we have to analyze the side of the assets of the consolidated




where B is one of the possible assets of the monetary authorities. Therate of
change of the monetary base can be written as:
1dB
Bdtfr1 'Bi/f
where= BJ/B is the share of each asset on the total base and each term
Ô.I!BfldB/dt) is the contribution of therate of change of each asset on the
mdnetary base.
We could aggregate the several assetson the standard form: total credit to the
government: total credit to the private sector and net foreign exchangeposition.
But due to some peculiarities of theBrazilian institutional system, we will dis-
aggregate the assets, giving now a brief explanation ofthe meaning of each of them.
In Table 4, the magnitudes of thecomponents of the monetary base for the period
1962 to 1970 are shown.
(a) Treasury Deficit: it isthe net accumulated cash position of the Federal
Government.
q Some ofthecoefficients of the money multiplier (Ii andr) are 'behavioral parameters", depending
on the profit maun1lzlng dec:sions ofthe banking system and the public. I didnot try to include a
sub-model to explain r and h dueto the fact that the high-poweredmoney is the dominant component of'%l.
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1960 1965 1970Index Bonds: this is the net positionof a set of operations whosenature
has been changing through time. Beforethe creation of the monetary
correction there were no readjustablebonds, and it was not Possible to
sell bonds on a long-term basis dueto the high level of inflation and to the
freeze of interest rates. However,there were the so-called "Treasury
Bonds" which were placed primarilyin the commercial banksas a
substitute for the compulsory deposits. Actually,this account includes the
sales of indexed bonds plus Treasury Bonds,which is a short-term debt
mechanism for Open Market Operations.
Loans from Banco do Brasil to the PrivateSector: in this account we
include all the loans to industrial andagricultural sectors of the economy.
We are adding also the loans of Bancodo Brasil to the state enterprises.
Rediscount : it is also an account that includesseveral kinds of operations.
We have all the accumulatednet position of rediscount for liquidity.
However, in the case of Brazil the rediscountpolicy has been used to
direct the credit towards the agriculturalsector, coffee operations,
promotion of exports for minimum pricepolicy, etc.
Price Support Policy: The Minister ofAgriculture is in charge of fixing
the price support for the agriculturalproducts. The management of the
funds needed for the purchase of theexcess supply of the agricultural
products is done by Banco do Brasil, andthe ceilings to fix the resources
for these operations are proposed bythe Minister of Agriculture and
approved by the Monetary Council.
Coffee Operations: it is the net positionof operations under the responsi-
bility of the Ministry of Industry andCommerce (which contains the
Brazilian Institute of Coffee). Therevenues of this account are derived
from the retention quota (a kind ofexport tax on coffee administered by the
National Monetary Council) and also fromthe sales of coffee from the
IBC inventories abroad, and the expendituresare due to purchases of
excess supply and rediscounts policies to coffee producers.
Net Foreign Reserves: thisaccount shows the cruzeiro value of the net
purchase (or net sales) of foreigncurrency due to a surplus or a deficit
(or surplus) in foreign currency, but alsoby the current exchange rate.
There is a whole set ofaccounts which are not included in our analysis. The
National Monetary Councilcan give advances to the National Development
Bank, to Caxa Economica Federal, andto many other financial agencies of the
government, in order to supply funds for certaintypes of operations. Finally, we
have to recognize that the National MonetaryCouncil can capture resources from
any of the institutions belonging to the national financialsystem that eventually
are facing an excess of resources over investmentsor, in the reverse, they can give
resources to each one of them. The instruments usedfor this purpose are the
indexed bonds. It is important tonote the flexibility which is built into the financial
system, showing that there are some degrees of freedom,not only to control the
total money supply, but also to shiftresources from one financial agency to the


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6Until 1964, the dominant elements in thegrowth of high-powered moneywas
the fiscal deficit and the loans by Bancodo BrasH to the private sector. This shows
that probably the governmentwas using the inflationary financeas a way to get
resources. We can see that despite the fact thatsome short-term Treasury Bonds
were sold to the public, its deflationary effectwas relatively small. Eventually the
lack ofcoordjnation between Bancodo Brash and SU MOC (The "Superintendence
of Money and Credit," whichwas the imperfect institutional substitute forthe
Central Bank till 1964) could beblamed for the excessive expansion ofthe loans of
Banco do BrasH to the privatesector. Probably this was very important inexplain- ing the fact that theexpansion of high-poweredmoney was almost out of control at that period.
After 1964, the Treasurypressure is slowly going down and at theend of the analyzed period this accountis only responsible for about IS of thetotal growth of the base. The monetary authoritiesstarted to utilize the sales of bondsto the public as a way to control the expansionofhigh-powered money. The expansionary
impact of the Banco do Brasilnever declined. After 1968, the big inflow ofnet foreign currency starts to dominatethe expansion of high-poweredmoney. The
inflows and outflows of foreigncurrency created a kind of stop andgo monetary
policy until 1968. when the crawlingpeg system was introduced. Between 1964and the early months of 1968, whenthe exchange rate was fixed,speculative capital
movements in the balance of payments createdfor some time sharpexpansions of the money supply (like theone during 1965) and sometimes also sharpreductions (like the one in 1966). It isrecognized that a fixed exchangerate in an inflationary
environment provokes these kinds ofinflows and outflows ofreserves, and prob-
ably the sudden reduction in therate of expansion of money supply in 1966,which
can be blamed by the recession that occurredin the early months of 1967,was
caused almost entirely by the outflowof foreign currency. It istrue that in 1966 the
government had a target rate of inflation of about10 percent and they triedto reduce the increasing prices witha sharp reduction in themonetary expansion. This was due simultaneouslyto a reduction on the fiscaltreasure pressure, to an increase of the sales of indexedbonds in the open marketoperations and also due to the big outtlow of foreignreserves. In the early months of 1967 theeconomy was already in a deep depression.The monetary authorities increasedthe rate of expansion of money supply mainlythrough the increase in the fiscaldeficit and also through a certain releaseof loans of Banco do Brasilto the private sector. From 1968 on wesee that first: the expansionary impactof the treasury keeps going down; second: theexpansionary effect of loans of Bancodo BrasH to the private sector arcmore or less kept under straightcontrol. After the introduction of the crawling-pegsystem combined with themaintenance of domestic interest rates above the level ofinternational interest rates, thereis a control of inflow of foreign currency which isin great part sterilizedby the sales of indexed bondsto the public.
Two further problemsrequire analysis: first, inincreasing the share of indexed bonds in the total ofhigh-powered money, thegovernment is giving back to the public a part of therevenue from inflation. Thisphenomenon acts as an clement inhibiting thegovernment in using the inflationarytax as a way to mobilizemore resources. In the second place.due to the fact thatmost of the net inflow of foreign
504capital was in the form of loanschannelled through the bankingsystem, the ratio
of loans to total money supplyincreased from 1968 on.'"
in this sense thegovernment not only Iried to reduce the rate ofexpansion of
the money supply in order toturn consistent the goal of the gradual reductionof
inflation, but also triedto change the ratio of loans tomoney in order to provoke
expansionary eftect on theaggregate supply of Ihe economy. Thiswas certainly one
of the key issues in the Brazilianstabilization policy which together withthe
generalization of indexation, permitteda gradual reduction of inflation and
minimization of the social cost.
7. CIovirwr-rRtvENijJ I:twMlNri..\rlox
For a long period before 1964,the Brazilian Government madea massive
use of the inflationary tax as a way to mobilizeresources. The utilization of only
one instrument (monetary policy) to attaintwo objectives (stabilization and in-
crease of public savings) has an obvious inconsistencythat can only be removed
tf monetary policy is assignedto internal stabilization (assuminga "closed"
economy), letting the fiscal policy and the lInancialmarket take care of savings.
In the present section it is shownthat: (a) due to the lags inresponse of it in
relation to changes inp, the government revenue from inflation willConverge very
fast to the new equilibrium, temptingthe government to use this mechanismas an
additional instrument to mobiliz,resources; (b) when the decision to stabilize is
taken, the gradual approach isshown to be better, avoiding massivelosses of
inflationary tax in thevery short run ; (c) when the share of indexed bondsiii high.
powered money increases, a substantialpart of the inflationary tax vilI be redis-
tributed to the public, thus reducing theincentives to utilize this form of financing.
If the banking systemwere non-existent, with the centralgovernment having
the monopoly of creation ofmoney, it would internalize all the taxrevenues from
inflation given by
(7.1) R=-1-'1= PdrPMth




which is the product of the "tax rate" i/P dP/d:.by the "tax base" (M/P)d.
When there is a private bankingsystem, the government revenue is
(7.3) =
'°in another paper we developa theory showing that the credit in real terms to the privatesector is a very important factor affecting theaggregate supply of the economy. See Pastore and Almonacid
11974).
505where K is the money multiplier, and the banks will collect
(7.4)
provided that they arc able to adjust the nominal interest rates Ofl loans to the
expected rate of inflation.
With the money multiplier around 2, the government will collect 50 percent of
the total revenue. Table 5 shows the levels of this revenue as a proportion to real
income (at the average quarterly value of 1970), for several rates of inflation, in full
eq uilibri urn.
TABLE 5
GOVERNMJNT RtVFNUE FROM INILAnos
For rates of inflation between 40 to 50 percentper year the revenue would be
around 10 percent of real income.
A more interesting exercise, however, isto evaluate how the revenue converges
to the new equilibrium, when the monetary authoritiesdecide to make a once-and-
for-all change inji. The path of n estimated in Section 3 yields the data included in
Tables 6 and 7.
In the first table we assume thatp =was at 5 percent per quarter, and the
monetary authorities increasep to 10 percent per quarter. The ratio Rh', which
was 4 percent, will be, at the new situation of fullequilibrium, 8 perc'1it. 1-lowever,
TABLE 6











0.05 208 7 10.4 0.04
0.10 193.6 19.4 0.07
0.20 166.5 333 0.11
0.30 1413 43.0 0.14
0.40 123.2 49.3 0.16
0.50 106.2 53.! 0.18
0.60 93.6 56.2 0. l 9
0.70 78.6 55.0 0.18
0.80 67.7 54.2 0.18
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0.10
0.082 0.018 169.05 16.91 0.086
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GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM 1NFtATtON
at the quarter where i increased R/y will go to 8.5 percent, and then will oscillate
converging to the new equilibrium. It shows that the government internalizes
immediately a revenue higher than the one at the new equilibrium position.
in Table 6 we show the reverse exercise. Assuming p = it = 0.20 per quarter,
and thatis reduced to 5 percent per quarter, the ratio R/v, which was 13 percent
will decline immediately to 3 percent, and then will oscillate until the new equilib-
rium is reached, at the level of R/y0.04.
A monetary shock will imply a substantial cut in public expenditures, and if
cost expenditures are inflexible downwards this cut will affect entirely public
investments, reducing the rate of growth.
The banking system will be internalizing a part of this revenue, which will be
growing if it grows (up to the point where the cost elasticity of the demand for
money is I). But a monetary shock will affect their revenues, and depending on
their cost structure probably some banks will go bankrupt.
Finally, as the share of indexed bonds in the total assets of monetary authori-
ties in increasing, the government redistributes to the public a part of their revenue
from inflation, creating a trap that makes the inflationary tax seif-destructing.
Uni&'ersiry ofSao Paulo, Brazil
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